DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 412 147 SO 027 639

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TITLE Student Ethical Development in Our Class Rooms: Using Connected Conversation and the Moral Imagination.

INSTITUTION Columbia Univ., New York, NY. Esther A. and Joseph Klingenstein Center for Independent School Education.

PUB DATE 1996-00-00
NOTE 75p.
AVAILABLE FROM The Esther A. and Joseph Klingenstein Center for Independent School Education, Box 125, Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 West 120th Street, New York, NY 10027; phone: 217-678-3156.
PUB TYPE Collected Works - Serials (022) -- Reports - Descriptive (141)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Codes of Ethics; Elementary Secondary Education; *Ethical Instruction; *Ethics; Integrity; *Moral Development; *Moral Values; *Personality Development; *Value Judgment

ABSTRACT

This paper offers suggestions for structural changes needed in the classroom to develop the moral side of students' lives. Curriculum designs often do not translate into moral behavior. A more systemic and philosophically pedagogical interest in moral development must begin to pervade classrooms in order to make them places where student ethical development is enhanced. All education is moral education and morals cannot be designated to one period during the school's day. The paper reviews the research on ethical and moral development and offers models for classroom use. Divided into three parts, the paper examines: (1) "Integrating the Theory"; (2) "The Other, Self-Identity, Connected Conversation and Authentic Public Spaces"; and (3) "Creating Rescuers." Contains 30 references. (EH)

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Student Ethical Development in Our Class Rooms:

Using Connected Conversation and the Moral Imagination

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank a number of people for help on this paper. In particular, Maxine Greene, Lee Knefelkamp and Pearl Kane have offered constant guidance and support and with out their insights and minds I would not have been able to complete this project.

I would also like to thank Richard Drew, School Head of Crystal Springs Uplands School, for allowing me the opportunity to take this year of study. His support is a testament to the commitment to faculty development that makes Crystal Springs Uplands School such a dynamic institution.

April 17, 1996

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Student Ethical Development in our Classrooms: Connected Conversation and the Moral Imagination

Part I
Integrating the Theory

Introduction

Robert Coles states at the beginning of his book, *The Moral Life of Children*, "I have always been interested in the moral side of my students lives. How do they determine what is right from wrong, what are their moral answers to my questions about literature?" (Coles, 32)This same curiosity has guided my development as an educator. Time and again the choice of texts, the development of lesson plans, and my contributions to extracurricular activities have been influenced by an umbrella of moral context. However, as I struggle with my own moral reasoning I am continually reminded of the complexities of finding moral answers in our everyday lives. How do I balance my self interests with society's needs? How should I respond to moral problems such as ethnic cleansing in Bosnia or homelessness in my own neighborhood? Then, how do I expect my students to respond? "Morality is not a subject," Paul Tillich writes, "it is a life put to the test in dozens of moments."(Coles, 38) These complexities, this constant testing of one's life, are also experienced in the school community. What I have experienced as an educator, however, leads to the conclusion that curriculum designs do not often translate into moral behavior. What is needed, and what this paper will attempt to explain, are structural changes in the classroom. A more systemic and philosophically pedagogical interest in moral

development must begin to pervade our class rooms in order to make them places where student ethical development is enhanced.

One of the most memorable and frustrating teaching experiences I have had occurred two years ago while teaching Orwell's *1984* to a class of sophomores. During the climatic torture scene between O'Brien and Winston Smith, Winston betrays his lover, Julia, rather than face getting eaten by rats. The scene is one of the most haunting and difficult in literature. Can we, as readers, forgive Winston his infidelity when faced by his greatest fear? Is he a moral hero, even though he fails to topple Big Brother? The class unanimously chastised Winston's decision. They said he betrays Julia when he decides to save himself instead of staying loyal. I argued with them and even brought in scenarios of people fighting the Nazi's as examples of individuals who fail but who try to fight oppression. They would not budge from their condemnation of Winston Smith.

It wasn't until two years later as I had lunch with one of the students in that class, now a senior, that I began to understand the complexity of moral development in adolescents. I was reminiscing with her about the class and asked her if she still thought Winston Smith was a "loser." "No," she said, "I suppose that he is a moral hero. What upset me is that he broke his one human connection with Julia when faced with death. Then he turns into a vegetable. But he did try and in that sense he was successful." This passing conversation (it is often the small talks we have with students that contain profound meanings) revealed a number of lessons. First, moral development is just that, developmental. We cannot expect our students to be at the same moral place as we are, but we can expect them to be on a path toward discovery. Second, while I saw Winston as a moral hero because he stood for freedom and individual rights, this student saw his betrayal as sincerely immoral. Connection in this case carried as much weight as principle and both moral orientations needed to be seen. I saw that there was another moral perspective at work in their decision about Winston, a perspective of equal value. In many ways then, my students were at a more developed stage of moral reasoning than I was. As

an educator, I am responsible for helping to develop both moral orientations: one of justice and principle and one of care and connection.

What we do know rather conclusively is that all aspects of a school speak to the moral life of the members of that community. Though, "teachers and administrators are not always fully aware of the moral potency of their actions,"(Jackson, xv) Michael Brosnan writes in the current issue of *Independant School*, "that everything about a school expresses its values- the way a classroom is arranged and decorated, the way a teacher addresses her students, the required courses, the offering of AP electives, the way time is allocated, the way adults interact with each other, the degree to which parents are involved with the school, the degree to which the school is involved in its local community. Everything." (14) Lawrence Kohlberg adds that many studies "suggest that a higher level of institutional justice is a condition for individual development of a higher sense of justice." (23) If our class rooms can be moral spaces then we may be able to translate this environmental structure into individual development.

Given the complexity and overarching scope of our moral domain, too often we practice a dualistic approach to moral education in our schools. We become embroiled in principle, or we coddle and care without a clear critical perspective. Both approaches are essential for the full moral growth of each of us, so we must not separate the theories. How then do we combine the ethics of care and justice, especially in our classrooms? Is it possible to create a classroom where moral development is integrated into the structure of the class so it does not become a mathematical rendering of a potential ethical dilemma? As Nel Noddings says, "in education the dominant model presents a hierarchical picture of moral reasoning. This emphasis gives ethics a contemporary, mathematical appearance, but it also moves discussion beyond the sphere of actual human experience." (Noddings, *Caring* 1) Importantly, "the primary aim of all education must be nurturance of the ethical ideal,"(Noddings, *Care* 6) a statement echoed by Dewey when he wrote "that moral principles are not arbitrary. . . that the term 'moral' does not designate a special region or

portion of life."(58) It seems clear that all education is moral education and that morals cannot be designated to one period during the school's day. Thus, as institutions of learning we must be committed to the ethical and moral development of our entire community. As teachers, we are responsible for the moral development of our students so we are obliged to think about how our class rooms can enhance this development.

In order to forge a fuller and more comprehensive theory of moral education it is important to review the theories of the two component ethics (justice and care) as we move toward a synthesized ethic that can be integrated into any class room.

Kohlberg, Gilligan and the Gender of Ethics

The two principle proponents of the ethics of justice and the ethics of care are Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, respectively. Kohlberg works from a theory of universal ethical principles in the tradition of Kant and roots his theory in the stage theory of Piaget. On the other hand, Gilligan is working from what has been termed a feminist perspective, basing much of her theory on her own observations but with a philosophical grounding in Hannah Arrendt, Iris Murdoch and Nel Noddings. Both theorists have made considerable contributions to our understandings of how adolescents develop ethically.

Kohlberg's stage theory traces ethical development according to how critically we can think about a dilemma. Table 1 outlines the stages of the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education.

Table 1:
Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Approach to Moral Education

I: Preconventional Level

At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right and wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of physical powers of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation.
The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms for respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority.

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation.
Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, or reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude or justice.

II. Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of *conformity* to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively *maintaining*, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved with it. At this level there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation.
Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention- "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation.
There is orientation towards authority, fixed rules and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level also has two stages:

Stage 5: The social contract, legalistic orientation.
Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing laws in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation.
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical...At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.[1]

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[1] This table is modified slightly from Kohlberg's article, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," *Developmental Counseling and Teaching*. Erickson, Whiteley eds. Brooks Coles Pub. 1980. 12-13. Much of this table is quoted directly from Kohlberg's article.

Kohlberg writes, "Since moral reasoning is clearly reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning: a person's logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the stage he can obtain."(14) Thus, moral reasoning becomes a critical thinking skill, and as we develop we are able to embrace sounder principles. "An adequate morality is principled. i. e., that it makes judgments in terms of universal principles applicable to all mankind. Principles are to be distinguished from rules. Conventional morality is grounded on rules, primarily, "thou shalt nots" such as the Ten Commandments, prescriptions of kinds of actions. Principles are, rather, universal guides to making a moral decision.(Kohlberg 16) Kohlberg is basically restating Kant's categorical imperative: "That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law."(18).

This idea of a high stage of moral development as principled is important to class room practice. Often, we point to the rules of the class room to enforce a certain code of behavior. At the early stages of development this is essential, for reasonable rules provide a vehicle for moral discussion and an emerging sense of community. In the later teen years we may want to appeal to critical thinking, the ability for students to reach outside themselves and even the class room to see how the construction of behavior is tied to larger principles that are freely chosen. For, "unlike rules which are supported by authority, principles are freely chosen by the individual because of their intrinsic moral validity."(Kohlberg 16)

Aristotle's Golden Rule: Treat others as you would like to be treated, is an example of a freely chosen principle. This is not an actual rule, but an individual may live by this maxim because it fits with how they would like to experience the world. For instance, a student may decide not to cheat and decide that all cheating is wrong because they discover that cheating hurts others and themselves. They think about how students end up getting credit for work they have not done and this devalues their own and other's work.

The principles we do end up embracing are to be based on justice and reciprocity. They must take into account, "first, the maximum liberty compatible with the like liberty of others and, second, no inequalities of goods and respect which are not to the benefit of all, including the least advantaged."(Kohlberg 17) As students develope ethically they may begin to wonder how we can embrace a capitalist society that is based on the unequal distribution of wealth. As student thinking becomes more sophisticated, they may question the validity of the very system that supports them, especially students in settings of privilege. Thus, though Kohlberg's theory is useful and important as a gauge for developing principles, the very structure of our society questions whether anyone in a capitalist society who has more than someone else is capable of leading a moral life. However, he notes that "political development is part of moral development"(20) and so perhaps we have not developed morally enough to take hold of a more equitable form of economics and politics.

Importantly, Kohlberg's final stage of moral development requires a good deal of detachment, as does Kant's categorical imperative. Both ideas require the subject to stand outside himself and look inward and outward at the same time: What would I want others to do in my place and do I want all others to do the same thing always? As Kohlberg's Stage Six states, the freely chosen principle is based on "logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency," and the principles are "abstract."(13) By keeping an abstract stance, Kohlberg is trying to ensure universality. He is also asking us to be self sufficient and to adhere to our principles because they are fair. Thus, the parent who is the police chief must treat his or her own child who has broken the law the same way he or she would treat any criminal. Emotion is to be controlled by intellect and connection to the subject must be relinquished in order to carry out the universal and reciprocal principles. Any plea to connection made by the other parent, for instance, would have to be rebuffed, for to bend would be unfair and an example of a larger dynamic that would usurp self

sufficiency. However, what is missing here is exactly the connection to the subject, to the other, a gap in ethics that Gilligan addresses in her theory.

Kohlberg's theory places too much emphases on principle and critical thinking and not enough emphases on connection and care. Because Kohlberg used only males in his study, Gilligan feels that he misses a different moral orientation that she labels as a feminine voice. "To see self sufficiency as the hallmark of maturity," Gilligan writes, "conveys a view of adult life that is at odds with the human condition- a view that cannot sustain the kinds of long term commitments and involvement with others that are necessary for raising and educating a child or for citizenship in a democratic society." ("Adolescent," 107) Gilligan's assertion has dramatic ramifications for the class room. If our goal is to raise good citizens who take part in a democratic society (most independent schools list this as part of their mission statement) then we must foster a commitment to community participation that will include principles of justice and reciprocity but must also include the ethical stances of care and connection. Importantly, both moral orientations are accesible.

> Like ambiguous figure perception where the same picture can be seen as a vase or two faces, the basic elements of moral judgment- self, others and relationship- can be organized in different ways, depending on how relationship is imagined or constructed. From the perspective of someone seeking or loving justice, relationships are organized in terms of equality, symbolized by the balancing of scales. Moral concerns focus primarily on problems of equality or oppression, and the moral ideal is one of reciprocity, or equal respect. From the perspective of someone seeking or valuing care, relationship connotes responsiveness, or attachment, a resiliency of connection that is symbolized by a network, or web. Moral concerns focus on problems of attachment or disconnection or abandonment, and the moral ideal is one of attention and response. Since equality and attachment are dimensions that characterize all

> forms of human connection, all relationships can be seen in both ways and spoken of in both sets of terms. Yet by adopting one or another moral voice or standpoint people can highlight problems that are associated with different kinds of vulnerability and focus attention on different types of concern. (Gilligan, "Adolescent," 111-112)

I have quoted at length here because Gilligan introduces us to a number of important ideas. First, our moral standpoint is often exposed through voice. When we refer to principle, "That's not fair," or when we refer to connection, "I feel abandoned," we are expressing our moral compass. Secondly, both orientations are clearly available to us at the same time. One orientation is not necessarily better for one type of moral problem. Even Kohlberg saw the need for connection when developing principles. He writes, "morality is a natural product of a universal tendency toward empathy or role taking, towards putting oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings."(21) Thirdly, Gilligan challenges us to move beyond principle as the guide for moral behavior. We know that many students are capable of referring to principle but often do not act ethically.(Kohlberg, 15) By having students evaluate relationships using a connective posture we may be able to enhance ethical behavior. On the other hand, those students who use care and yet cannot move their care into larger communities (i.e.- someone may care deeply about their own family members and do almost anything to see that they are fed but walk by homeless people who are hungry) may benefit from viewing relationships from a principled orientation. Finally, by pinpointing vulnerability as an entry point into how we forge relation, Gilligan asks that we become open to possibility. Vulnerability is not seen as a weakness but as an entry point for learning. Adolescents, in particular, often feel vulnerable, and this state may make them especially fertile for enhancing their moral development.

The proponents of an ethic of care say connection is a more realistic barometer for ethical action. Ethical behavior "is not simply a matter of principle that compels us to defend one threatened or abused," writes Noddings, "it is an attitude that pervades life and establishes the human bonds upon which we depend as upon a faith."(*Care* 112) To strive for justice only can lead us to tragedy because, "clinging to the unattainable, by believing it with our heads while knowing otherwise with our hearts"(Noddings, *Care* 110) places us in a impossible predicament that results in wrong decisions or paralysis. By returning to the scenario of the police chief and his or her child we can see that an ethic based only on principle is problematic. It is appropriate to ask whether that parent actually should imprison the child, especially if he or she knows that the prison system will not help the child learn more ethical behavior? Also, the police chief may actually sense that the child may be harmed ethically by a prison sentence. If the parent cares deeply for his or her child, then there is a strong possibility that the police chief will choose not to arrest his or her child. Is the police chief, then, an unethical person? Obviously, connection and care also speaks to his or her decision.

Gilligan and others have used fables to ascertain adolescent moral orientations. They asked students to voice their solutions to classic ethical delemmas. Two voices were repeatedly heard; participants responded to moral problems using a voice of justice or care as frameworks that organize their moral thinking and feelings. Also, almost all the participants could switch frames when asked, "Is there another way to solve this problem." (See Gilligan, "Adloescent" and Kay Johnson 49-71) "By at least 11 years of age, most children indicate knowledge of both orientations. This shows that gender difference does not reflect knowing or understanding only one orientation."(Johnston 60) However, boys more generally choose a position of justice, while girls generally are able to work from both orientations.(Johnston, Gilligan, "Adolescent") Table 2 outlines the main differences in the two perspectives.

Table 2

Moral Reasoning: Kohlberg and Gilligan[2]

Content	Preconventional	Conventional	Postconventional
Kohlberg			
Morality is based on an ethic of rights and rules. Concept of self is viewed from perspective of separateness from others.	Moral reasoning is viewed in terms of consequences. It is defined by the avoidance of punishment or by the acquisition of desired rewards via hedonistic reciprocity.	Moral reasoning is determined by group practices and rules. Social approval is paramount. Later, rules for a particular group are viewed as not sufficient and replaced with regulations to avoid chaos	Moral reasoning is evidenced by the denial of a reified system of regulations. The possibility of change through procedures is emphasized. Late Later morality is defined by self chosen principles that are universally and consistently applied.
Gilligan			
Morality is based on an ethic care and responsibility Concept of self is viewed from a perspective of empathy and connectedness with others.	Moral reasoning is viewed in terms of consequences. It is defined by the avoidance of punishment or by the acquisition of desired rewards via hedonistic reciprocity.	Moral reasoning is determined by the ability to care for and protect others. The capacity to nurture and a need for connectedness lead to a restriction of self-expression.	Moral reasoning is reflected by an acknowledgment of personal desires and a consideration of others. An acceptance of the responsibility for choices exists

[2] Taken from West, John D. and Bursor, Davele. "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Gender Issues in Moral Development," *Humanistic Education and Development*. June, 1984. 136

As educators, our ultimate aim is to have our students explore and understand that both orientations are available to them. "Moral maturity presumably would entail an ability to see in both ways and to speak both languages." (Gilligan, "Adolescent" 113) Indeed, there is actual danger if we do not promote both ways of seeing, especially for young women.

Gilligan shows that adolescent girls prefer to stay connected instead of leaving (exiting) a situation. In doing so they wish to maintain voice, even though it may not be a voice that is fully heard. Exit or abandonment becomes the option of last resort when faced with a situation of conflict. "In this light, adolescent girls who demonstrate a reluctance to exit may articulate a different voice– a voice which speaks of loyalty to persons and identifies detachment as morally problematic."(Gilligan, "Exit" 146) Gilligan goes on to write, "In resisting detachment and criticizing exclusion, adolescent girls hold to the view that change can be negotiated through voice and that voice is the way to sustain attachment across the leavings of adolescence."("Exit" 148) By keeping a sense of attachment, voice is maintained and even developed, thus self identity also evolves in relation with one's experience with the other.

Because the forming and maintaining of relation is paramount to establishing voice, detachment then would connote defeat and even a giving up of self. Indeed, "identity is formed through the gaining of voice or perspective, and self is known through the experience of engagement with different voices or points of view."(Gilligan, "Exit" 153). Voice, self identity and care are bound together in the development of the adolescent as a moral agent. In traditional ethics (Kohlberg's model), students are asked to detach in order to assess a moral problem. But even the task of assessing moral decision making goes against how many women think: "Many women disliked the Kohlberg task. Being "hypothetical" it seemed remote from their experience (unreal, academic, just a game, as some women said) and it lacked the contextual detail they felt they needed to make a thoughtful judgment."(Clinchy, "Ways of Knowing" 181) This points to a number of important questions: What happens to those students who want to stay connected but are

asked to make moral decisions based on principle only? Are we jeopardizing their voice and their self identity by expecting them to use a particular form of moral reasoning?

Presently our schools are geared toward a principles orientation when confronting moral problems. "In one high school, students of both sexes tended to characterize care-focused solutions or inclusive problem-solving strategies as utopian or outdated: one student linked them with impractical Sunday School teachings, one with the outworn philosophy of hippies. Presumably, students in the school who voiced care strategies would encounter these characterizations."(Gilligan, "Adolescent" 115) Added to this characterization of caring as peripheral is the adolescence's proclivity toward conformity. So while a moral voice of care may be emerging, it is then suppressed by peers and the norms of the society. Ultimately, "although detachment connotes the dispassion that signifies fairness in justice reasoning, the ability to stand back from oneself and from others and to weigh conflicting claims evenhandedly in the abstract, detachment also connotes the absence of connection and creates the conditions for carelessness or violation, for violence toward others or oneself."(Gilligan, "Adolescent" 120). How then do we merge these theories of connection and justice? It is imperative that we do so in order to ensure an inclusive place for all our students. That both orientations are assessable seems clear, but now we must learn to value both perspectives equally and at the same time. One orientation need not overshadow the other and perhaps we can combine them. The danger is in thinking dualistically about ethical behavior. Instead there is a need to move toward contextual thinking in solving ethical problems, a perspective that William Perry helps us to understand.

William Perry and Contextual Thinking

Perry breaks up intellectual and ethical development into nine positions. He uses the word position to note that we move back and forth between positions given the context in which we act. He purposely stays clear of the term "stage" to show that we need not move through one position to get to the next, nor do we permanently conquer a position once we have moved into it. Table 3 outlines the positions in the Perry Scheme of intellectual and ethical development.

Table 3
The Perry Scheme of Intellectual and Ethical Development[3]

Dualism:
The first two positions represent a view of knowledge as dualistic. The learner views himself as a receptacle ready to receive Truth; as a result, he has difficulty with academic tasks requiring recognition of conflicting points of view or even use of his own opinion.

Position 1: "The student sees the world in polar terms of we-right-good-versus others-wrong-bad. Right Answers for everything exist absolutely, known to Authority whose role is to teach them"(Perry, 1970, 9)

Position 2: "The student perceives diversity of opinions and accounts for them as unwarranted confusion in poorly qualified Authorities or as exercises set by Authority so we can learn to find the Answer for ourselves. (9)

Multiplicity:
Position three and four represent the broadening of the student's view. More diversity is seen by the student and must be accounted for. At first, this diversity is seen in terms of quantity only. But in the later phase of Multiplicity truth is relegated to a small corner of the broader realm of knowledge which is uncertain and the student begins to appreciate the use of supportive evidence-- a method for making sense of the confusion.

Position 3: "The student accepts diversity and uncertainty as legitimate but temporary in areas where Authority grades him in these areas on good "expression" but remains puzzled as to standards."(9)

Position 4: "The student perceives legitimate uncertainty to be extensive translating knowledge into "anyone has a right to his own opinion." The student often discovers qualitative relativistic reasoning as a special case of "what they want", a pseudo-relativism (9)

Relativism:
Position five and six describe the movement to recognition of knowledge as relative. With position five, all knowledge and values are disconnected from the concept of truth or absolute correctness. The sense of relativism of knowledge may result in the loss of the old signposts and the experience of being lost and alone in a chaotic world. Thus the student may reflect his learning back upon himself and question the foundations of meaning in his own life. Movement from position four to five, and six creates awareness that much of what "truth" the student "creates" will emerge from his own experience and judgment as well as external factors.

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[3] Taken from Knefelkamp, Lee. "Student Development Profile." Handout of readings for course at Teachers College, 62-64.

Position 5: "The student perceives all knowledge and values (including authority's) as contextual and relativistic and subordinates dualistic right-wrong functions to the status of a special case, in context." (9)

Position 6: "The student apprehends the necessity of orienting himself in a relativistic world through some form of personal commitment (distinguished from unexamined commitment, e.g., maintenance of childhood religious beliefs)." (9)

Commitment in Relativism:

During positions seven, eight, and nine, the student gradually accepts the responsibility of the pluralistic world and acts by commitment to establish his identity. There are two components to commitment. First, a coming to terms with the content of one's commitment by selecting a particular career, a set of values, a partner. The other aspect seems to be based upon the individual's recognition that within himself are many paradoxical personal themes, and that identity resolution requires finding a point of equilibrium. For example, a student will attempt to pin down where he stands on the continuum of activism versus contemplation as an approach to life.

Position 7: "The student makes an initial commitment in some area." (10)

Position 8: "the student experiences the implications of commitment and explores the issues of responsibility." (10)

Position 9: "The student experiences the affirmation of identity among multiple responsibilities and realizes commitment as an ongoing, unfolding activity through which he expresses his life style."(10)

The usefulness and implications of Perry's model on education and the classroom are far reaching (See Appendix 1 for a detailed chart on how the different stages play themselves out in the classroom and in teaching.) Perry's Position Nine falls under the category of Commitment in Relativism. This position depends on context, we see multiple responsibilities and we are able to know that our judgments are often flawed but they represent our best effort at the time. We understand that other options are open to us (choice is relative), so we know that we are simply making the best decision with the information we have. It is not the only decision and we see our own limitations in relation to other people and the decisions they may make. Thus we recognize the legitimate presence of the other and in doing so grant them a profound humanness, for their judgments are also valid though we do not have to agree with them.

The concept that knowledge is built from experience is essential. There is no outstanding Truth to adhere to or to seek answers from. For example, as a white male I have certain choices open to me that an African-American male may not have (Sartre would call this our facticity. I am not able to be African American nor, being five feet nine inches am I able to be six feet seven inches.) I understand that the decisions I make are based on my experience but I also understand that my choice is not the only choice. The African-American man may make a different choice. His choice may be different from my choice, but it is not wrong. His choice is based on his experience, and he understands that even with his own experience he has multiple choices. This is not pure relativism, for the theory does not ask us that we agree with everyone's choices and opinions. In relativism, we simply give up on constructing dialogue about choice and accept all choices made. There is no commitment in relativism. In Position Nine we are able to commit to our choice in context precisely because we know our alternative choices. Making the choice is difficult because it calls for deep reflection on both orientations: do I want others to make this choice

and how will this choice affect others? In Commitment in Relativism we must try to understand the other person's context and then with that information take a moral position.

Perhaps most importantly is that Perry combines connection and principle in his final position. The combination of justice and care is in the term commitment for it calls us to a higher order (principle) and calls us to a caring stance. By commitment to something we are able to express our identity. However, he does not say that commitment is necessarily to other people. Thus, we must modify Perry's vision a bit to include the feminist perspective of care for others.

Connected Knowing and the Other

Moral development then, is closely tied to recognizing the legitimacy of others. If we remain dualistic we adhere to our beliefs because they were given to us and when challenged we revert to a formula of thinking: I am right you are wrong. When we freely choose our beliefs (as in Kohlberg's final stage) or when we commit and then understand how commitment is tied to self identity and care (as with Perry and Gilligan) then we "become alive to moral possibilities, . . . [we] encounter a way of being that is both attractive and strange - different (but perhaps not too different) from the realities one has known."(Clinchy, "Ways" 183) Thus, we must see the other in order to know that there are other possible moral stances from our own. We must connect to others who are different in some respect and through this commitment to see the other we are able to grow

morally. In some respects this is similar to Kant's practical imperative or Realm of Ends which is stated as "Act[ing] so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only."(Kant 46) My treating someone as an end in themselves enables me to see the other person as an equal, not as someone who needs modifying or convincing. In some ways this ideal relationship with the other is also similar to Sartre's goal of being-for-others: "This relationship, in which the other must be given to me directly as a subject although in connection with me, is the fundamental relationship."(Sartre, 253) Both philosophers speak of connection as central to ethical behavior and both ideals are relational. The place to combine the principled and caring stances is in our relationship with others. It is what Perry shows in his later stages under the guise of commitment but it is made even clearer by Blythe McVicker Clinchy in her article, "Ways of Knowing and Ways of Being: Epistemological and Moral Development in Undergraduate Women."

Clinchy redefines Perry's "Commitment in Relativism" as "Procedural Knowers." Procedural knowers combine two types of knowing: separate knowing (equivalent to Kohlberg's justice stance) and connected knowing (equivalent to Gilligan's care stance). Together, the two types of knowing allow the individual to both understand a position and evaluate a position. Table Four outlines Clinchy's different types of knowers.

Table 4
Blythe Clinchy's Different Types of Knowers[4]

1. Received Knower:
"Received knowers tend to assume that anyone who is part of their 'we' is exactly like them, morally and in every other way."("Ways" 183-4) This is basically the same as Kohlberg's conventional thinker and Perry's Dualistic thinker.

2. Subjectivist Knower:
The subjectivist knower believes "moral values are intuitions that are formed as the residue of experience; they are determined by one's particular circumstances."("Ways" 185) This is similar to Perry's Multiplists. Subjectivists knowers look inside themselves for knowledge. They are their own authorities.

3. Separate Knower:
"At the heart of separate knowing is the detachment characteristic of critical thinking and scientific method. The separate knower keeps herself at a distance from the object she is examining." ("Ways" 187) "It has some of the characteristics required for moral sensitivity: It is selfless, objective and attentive. Separate knowers scrupulously avoid projection. It is just but it is not loving, it is primarily critical rather than receptive." ("Ways" 88) "The separate knower holds herself aloof from the object she is trying to analyze.... In separate knowing, you separate the knower from the known."("Critical" 39)

4. Connected Knower:
"Connected knowing, like separate knowing, requires imagination, but the connected knower tries to imagine the real- to make present... the other's reality rather than invent alternative realities. Connected knowing is based on attachment rather than detachment. ... In Buber's terms, the text is a 'Thou,' a subject rather than an 'it,' an object of analysis. The heart of connected knowing is empathy, and empathy entails acceptance." ("Ways"189) Judgment is suspended "because [not only does] it involve inflicting one's own standards on others, but because it interferes with the process of understanding." "They deliberately bias themselves in favor of what they are examining."("Critical" 40)

5. Procedural Knower:
Procedural Knowers "use connected procedures in attempting to understand a position; they turn to separate knowing to evaluate the position."("Ways" 195) With "this new objectivity, the procedural knower is open for the first time to alternative visions of reality."("Ways" 187)

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[4] All quotes are from Clinchy, Blythe. "Ways of Knowing and Ways of Being: Epistemological and Moral Development in Undergraduate Women," in *Approaches to Moral Development.* Garrod, Andrew Ed. Teachers College Press, NY. 1993 or from Clinchy, Blyth. "On Critical THinking and Connected Knowing." *Liberal Education.* 75(5): 1989, 5-40.

Procedural knowing is the highest form of knowing. Clinchy roots knowing in a social connection. Whereas Perry has us understand that there are other choices because there are other relative experiences, Clinchy asks us to suspend our disbelief in the other in order to know the other. Thus we understand there are other choices because we understand another point of view. Procedural knowers believe first, then doubt. "Rather than trying to evaluate the perspective she is examining," Clinchy says, the procedural knower, "tries to understand it. Rather than asking, 'Is it right?' she asks, "What does it mean?" When she says, 'Why do you think that?' she means, 'What in your experience led you to that position?' and not 'What evidence do you have to back that up?'"(Clinchy, "Critical" 40) By using this form of inquiry the procedural knower reaches outside his or her own experience across the space between individuals to understand another experience, then returns to him or herself to evaluate the other with this new knowledge of the other.

Clinchy's schema comes closest to integrating the two voices (or orientations) of principles and connection. Importantly, moral behavior takes place between people in this model, it is not in people. By rooting morality in relation, we can shift our attention from the singular behavior of individuals and concentrate on the space between individuals as the core for ethical behavior. As Clinchy writes, "Perhaps the development of moral sensitivity is more accurately described as taking place between individuals, rather than with in them." ("Ways" 198) But, how do we define this space between individuals and how do we cross it?

Part II

The Other, Self Identity, Connected Conversation and Authentic Public Spaces

> "The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of human relationships which exists whenever men live together."(Arrendt 183-184)
>
> "To impede communication is to reduce men to the status of 'things' - and this is a job for oppressors."(Freire 109)

Ethical behavior is more practically viewed as existing between people and this space between people is most often filled with words and/or actions. For the class room, both words and action are important, but I wish to concentrate on words at this point, saving action for the last part of the paper. Promoting what Blyth Clinchy calls "connected conversation" or dialogue is central to ethical development in our students. None of the theories discussed in part one explicitly label dialogue as an integral part of their ethic. However we fill the space between us with words and thus the nature of our discourse is central to how we treat others, especially in the classroom. Certainly action, too, is important, for "action and speech go on between men."(Arrendt 182) and we tend to concentrate from an ethical perspective on what our students do in our classes more than on what they say and write. We would not tolerate violent action or other forms of action that constitute a breaking of the community norms, but we do often allow words to flow unabated that violate an ethical stance. If we can concentrate on creating a space where we

can meet the other through dialogue and then meet ourselves in our classrooms, I propose that ethical development will follow.

How we choose to use words and what they signify determines how this space is defined. If we use words of hate we are filling the space between us with hate. Also, "the moment we want to say *who* somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying *what* he is; we get entangled in a description of qualities he necessarily shares with others like him; we begin to describe a type or 'character' in the old meaning of the word, with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes us."(Arrendt 181) Thus, in order to fill the space between us with words that promote moral growth we must accept that, "the beginning of all human relationships is 'I accept you as you are.' But that does not mean I confirm everything you do just because you do it. That would be putting aside the reality of the relationship, the reality of myself as a person confronting you. It is not that I judge you from above or that I moralize at you. Yet our very relationship is a demand on you as on me, I have come to you from where I am in my uniqueness."(Clinchy, "Ways" 198) Seeing the two uniquenesses: yours and mine, is the first step in creating a moral dialogue. Connected conversation not only allows a speaker to legitimize the other but it also enables us to know ourselves. "A person finds himself as person through going out to meet the other, through responding to the address of the other. He does not lose his center, his personal core, in an amorphous meeting with the other. If he sees through the eyes of the other and experiences the other's side, he does not cease to experience the relationship from his own side."(Clinchy, "Ways" 196-197)

Moral behavior then is linked to how we cross this space between us, how we keep our own uniqueness and how we recognize the other person's uniqueness. Though this space may seem "intangible, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the 'web' of human relationships indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality."(Arrendt 183) By naming and defining this space it is possible to concentrate on it in our class rooms.

Ethical dialogue should not be confused with political correctness. It is not about protecting other people's feelings, nor is it about relativism, which makes whatever someone says acceptable. Instead, connected conversation is how we become connected knowers, it is what enables us to identify with the other in a concrete way . As Clinchy writes, "For our [connected] knowers, moral development evolves in [a] more interactive fashion, through a type of dialogue that we have called 'connected conversation' and our informants call 'real talk'"("Ways" 197) There is a give and take in this type of conversation. It moves decidedly away from Perry's dualism stage where the student views others as authority figures with answers. Instead, "each participant is an active subject: each speaks as well as listens, trying to articulate her own perspective as well as eliciting others' perspectives."(Clinchy, "Ways" 197) The teacher in the class room becomes another 'other', perhaps someone to direct the interaction. More importantly, the students become 'other' others as well and not repositories for our knowledge.

It is only through this conversation that we can truly know the other. Though much has been written about moral imagination (I will discuss moral imagination later in Part III.) it is direct conversation that allows us to know and then to treat others ethically. "Together, the participants construct new perspectives. As the psychologist James Youniss says, 'One person does not come to understand another by mentally imaging what it might be like to be in the other's shoes,' for as the philosopher Elizabeth Spellman puts it, 'If I only rely on my imagination to think about you and your world, I'll never come to know you and it. Rather, Youniss says, common perspectives are co-constructed through discussion."(Clinchy, "Ways" 197-98) Kohlberg also recognized that dialogue is integral to moral development. One of the most important elements of moral discussion is "an atmosphere of interchange and dialogue... in which conflicting moral views are compared in an open manner."(Kohlberg 22) Only by facing the other can these views be exchanged. There are numerous examples of conflict resolution that only begin making headway when the two parties sit down across from each other and begin negotiating by recognizing the

other. The Palestinian and Israeli peace talks is just one such example. However, we must not confuse negotiation with connected conversation. In negotiation, "each contender has different preferences and beliefs. All contenders have various forms of power, and all compete for their share of scarce resources."(Bolman, 118) Negotiation is blatantly political while connected conversation includes themes of care and justice.

Promoting connected conversation has important ramifications for the class room. We know, for example, that adolescent girls value voice as an integral tool in meeting moral challenges. How then, do we promote and expect dialogue to take place in our classrooms? Between whom? Just the teacher and student or between students as well? Is silence to be interpreted as acceptance of a view point? These are questions we must ask ourselves as educators if we are to build ethical spaces in our class rooms.

It is also useful to define "connected conversation" by what it is not. Often the most common tools we apply to spur student participation get in the way of connected conversation. The types of conversations that usually occur in our classrooms, mainly Socratic dialogue and discussion, are not necessarily effective for promoting ethical development in our students.

In many independent schools, the Socratic method of teaching is prominent. It is important to distinguish between the Socratic method of teaching and the idea of connected conversation. In the Socratic method "one person, the teacher, engages in a dialogue with another person, the student, with a view towards persuading the student to recognize that what he or she had taken for granted to be 'obviously true' is, at best, questionable: the teacher does not tell the student that his or her belief is mistaken or demonstrate it empirically; rather through a series of careful selected questions which elicit more of the student's belief system, the teacher gradually leads the student to see that his or her original belief is in fact inconsistent with other beliefs that he or she holds dear." (Pekarsky 120) However, along the way and by design, Socratic cross examination also gives rise to humility. Humility in itself is a good quality, but if the student has no belief to replace the

false belief exposed, then confusion and perplexity can take root instead of humility and understanding. Indeed, "Dewey holds that perplexity is desirable only to the extent that it awakens thought; if, however, it overwhelms or demoralizes, then the teacher has taught badly."(Pekarsky 126) Furthermore, Socratic dialogue is based on critical reasoning. Kohlberg stresses Socratic dialogue as a way to stimulate movement to the next stage of moral reasoning.(Kohlberg 18) As such, it is limited in the caring connection the teacher can make with the student. The teacher is not interested in using connected knowing, only separate knowing is important as he or she moves the student to a state of humility. Finally, the teacher conceals his or her intent from the student as he or she moves the student to discover their mistaken reasoning. Though perhaps a useful tool at times, this concealment precludes an honest conversation, thus trust is broken unless the student is told the teacher's intent from the start.

Dialogue and Discussion

Connected conversation cannot be political, as it is played out in a Socratic dialogue. Nor is connected conversation mere discussion.Most independent school class rooms use discussion, not dialogue. Often, the discussion is a way for students to show they have mastered the material. Clinchy writes, "in most classrooms run by teachers who pride themselves on encouraging discussion, discussion means disagreement, and the student has two choices: to disagree or remain silent. ... Argument is the only style of discourse that has found much favor in academe."("Critical" 40) Peter Senge in his book *The Fifth Discipline: The Art of The Learning Organization* distinguishes between discussion and dialogue. In discussion, "the subject of common interest may be analyzed and dissected from many points of view provided by those who take part. ...Yet the main purpose of [discussion] is normally 'to win' and in this case winning means to have one's views accepted by the group."(240) By contrast dialogue is "a free flow of meaning between people, in the sense of a stream that flows between two banks."(Senge 240) When

dialogue works, "people are no longer in opposition,...rather they are participating in this pool of common meaning, which is capable of constant development and change."(Senge 241)

Dialogue would enable students to work collaboratively to build on their own individual understandings and in the process they would create an ethical space between them. "The purpose of dialogue," Senge continues, "is to go beyond any one individual's understanding. We are not trying to win in a dialogue. We all win if we are doing it right. In dialogue, individuals gain insights that simply could not be achieved individually."(241) Thus dialogue accomplishes an integration of the two ethical orientations. By creating a community language that moves beyond the individual we are creating an ethical space between individuals where they can see the other and all be seen. The common language becomes a universal principle and adheres to reciprocity and justice. Similarly, because the dialogue is communal, it is caring; all members of the dialogue are part of the larger consciousness.

That is not to say that individual voices are silenced, as they can be in discussion. Importantly, conflict is an integral part of dialogue for, "arguments are admissible- indeed, essential - on the context of real talk, and disagreement signifies not condescension but genuine respect."(Clinchy, "Ways" 198) Dialogue does not ask for acquiescence nor for domination. Nel Noddings adds, "that consensus cannot guarantee moral rightness or goodness. Certainly in a finite community people might all agree and yet be completely wrong."(Noddings, "Conversation" 110) Rather, dialogue is a flow of language that brings people along together to a higher level of thinking and action. We have all participated at some point in our lives in a conversation with a group that simply moved along and before we knew it the group dialogue was stimulating and new because we had moved beyond our own abilities. This feeling is true dialogue and it should be more of a goal in our class rooms.

Senge identifies three basic conditions for effective dialogue:

1. all participants must "suspend" their assumptions, literally to hold them "as if suspended before us.";
2. all participants must regard one another as colleagues;
3. there must be a facilitator who "holds the context" of dialogue. (243)

We have already identified these conditions using the language of ethical development. The first condition is a similar form of connected knowing. The subject suspends their judgment because it will get in the way of knowing and hearing the other. Condition two is a restatement of Kant's practical imperative (treating others as ends and not and means) but goes beyond that to include a sense of common community. If one student regards another student as favored or more entitled to speak then they are not true colleagues. "Hierarchy is antithetical to dialogue," Senge writes, and "everyone involved must truly want the benefits of dialogue more than he wants to hold onto his privileges of rank."(245) Given the vulnerability of the adolescent, creating a speace without hierarchy is challenging. But, by linking dialogue to personal growth it is possible to forge a communal spirit in our class rooms.

Condition three is perhaps the most relevant for the class room. Often we set up hierarchical systems in the class room with the teacher at the top and the students, depending on their academic success, spread out below. Much has been written about creating student centered class rooms because it benefits the learning of the individual.(See *In Search of Understanding: The Case for Constructivist Classrooms*") However, student centered classrooms may also enhance the individual's ethical development as well. Thus, the teacher's role can be the 'facilitator' but it should not exclude the opportunity for individual students to take on this role. In the past, I have often assigned individual students as discussion leaders for the day. These classes sometimes worked and sometimes became monologues given by the appointed leader (a reflection of my own

experience when sometimes I am able to stimulate discussion and sometimes I am speaking *at* the students). Rarely does the discussion become dialogue. Why?

The reason lies in how we expect our students to generate dialogue. Importantly, reflection and inquiry are the building blocks for dialogue. As Senge notes, "dialogue that is grounded in reflection and inquiry skills is likely to be more reliable and less dependent on particulars of circumstance, such as chemistry among team members."(249) Reflection is a form of critical thinking or separate knowing, a stepping back from the subject and thinking *on* it. Inquiry, when done in the form of a community of colleagues is connected knowing, reaching across the in-between to understand the other. Together, reflection and inquiry combine to make procedural knowers, the goal of moral development. Consequently, a clearer distinction must be made in our class rooms between discussion and dialogue. Dialogue should play a more active role and become a more common goal.

Connected conversation is also highly moral because it is based on a Kantian notion of good will and a desire to connect with others. As Paulo Freire notes, "Self sufficiency is incompatible with dialogue. Men and women who lack humility (or have lost it) cannot come to the people, cannot be their partners in naming the world."(71) If the dialoguers do not communicate in good faith, if they "expect nothing to come of their efforts, their encounter will be empty and sterile, bureaucratic and tedious."(Freire 73) Furthermore, without this faith in people, "dialogue is a farce which inevitably degenerates into paternalistic manipulation."(Freire 72) How often as teachers do we make decisions based on our previous experience with a student? Are we approaching this student in good faith? How often do we discount student voices because of their age? Do we sort our piles of papers according to how difficult they will be to grade, knowing that one pile will be "easier" to grade than the other because we assume they will be more skillful? How does this "paternalistic manipulation" keep us from hearing the student's voice?

Connected conversation and dialogue is not managed. Some thinkers, such as Jurgen Habermas, have done extensive work on how dialogue influences ethical growth.

However, "Habermas depends on... highly idealized conversation. It is not the rough and tumble conversation of real people. Participants must understand that certain moves are forbidden by the very logic of argumentation. Anything that closes off debate is antithetical to the whole enterprise. Hence competent participants do not make dogmatic assertions, put self interest above logic, attack persons instead of arguments, or insist that personal stories carry more than a modicum of weight as evidence. Such a highly constrained conversation has little resemblance to real conversation."(Noddings, "Conversation" 109) Though it is important to have parameters on dialogue such as those Senge suggests, dialogue differs from discussion or argument (debate) in that it allows the free flow of individual expression. It is perhaps too much to ask, and even wrong to ask, adolescents to adhere to a strictly defined policy for talking. Also, the development that occurs in such structured discourse is based on rules (Kohlberg's stage 4: Conventional level of behavior) and therefore the type of discussion is not necessarily freely chosen.

The other danger of teaching the skills of argumentation is sophistry. "We do not wish," Noddings writes, "to turn out students who can make the poorer case seem better and the better case seem poorer by their skill in argumentation,"(Noddings, "Conversation" 110) and philosopher Paulo Freire adds that "[dialogue] is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another."(70) When we teach debate and public speaking we often ask our students to adhere to appeals to the intellect and label appeals to emotion as irresponsible. However, we rarely note that intellectual appeals can also be irresponsible if they ignore connection and care. Indeed, the partner(s) in conversation are more important than the subject of conversation. Thus, when we ask students to "prove their point" they are often willing to relinquish care for the other in order to be understood. As Noddings states, "for both parties in the conversation under consideration, the partner is more important than the topic, the conclusion or the argument."(Noddings, "Conversation" 116) Using the language of Clinchy, the voice of separate knower is argument, while the voice of the connected knower is narrative. When

we care for others we want to hear the stories of their lives, not argue about their lives. William Carlos Williams reminds Robert Coles and us that "Their story, yours, mine - it's what we all carry with us on this trip we take, and we owe it to each other to respect our stories and learn from them."(Coles, "Call" 30)

Collaborative Learning and Connected Conversation

I am proposing, then, a major shift in the way teaching is performed in the class room. The subject matter does not take central stage, rather the relationship between students and the creation of a space where the in-between is crossed through a cultivated dialogue becomes the primary goal. After all, what good is knowledge if it is used to hurt others? Without a strong connection to our moral lives, subjects become a mere collection of facts and superficial concepts. Dewey saw this problem of separating learning from our social connectiveness, "To form habits... apart from any existing social situation, is, to the letter, teaching the child to swim by going through the motions outside of the water. The most indispensable condition is left out of account, and the results are correspondingly partial."(Dewey 14) As the beginning of this paper notes, all education is moral education, and dialogue and connected conversation is at the heart of the process for ethical growth.

Student centered learning takes on new meaning in this light. Learning becomes not only pursuing individual interests in the classroom but also learning together in the space between individuals. Collaborative learning, in particular, seems especially appropriate to accomplishing this type of class room. Michael Oakeshott, in Kenneth Bruffee's book, *Collaborative Learning* defines education as "an initiation into the skill and partnership of conversation in which we learn to recognize voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation."(Bruffee 113) Again we revisit the theme that education is interactive with the voice of the other. Indeed, even given that connected conversation does occur, "if the talk with the knowledge communities we are members of is narrow, superficial, biased, or

limited to clichés, our thinking is almost certain to be so, too."(Brufee 114) Good talk begets good thought. With collaborative learning we extend our knowledge communities to include diverse views rather than relying on our own set of views or a framework which simply supports what we already know. "The importance of collaborative learning," Brufee goes on to say, "is that it acknowledges differences and creates conditions in which students can negotiate the boundaries between the knowledge communities they belong to."(124) Consequently, dialogue takes place with in a community (a collaborative group) but also across knowledge communities (the set of views each student brings to the group).

Often collaborative learning is a struggle for our students, and they complain about various interpersonal problems. Some say that they have done all the work, others say they have not been heard, still others stay silent and simply go along with the group's decision. The reasons for these problems often lie in the task the group is being asked to accomplish. If the task is too concrete, then the answer seems easily attainable and the members of a group will struggle to promote their own solution to the problem on the group. If the task is beyond any individual member's ability, then collective thinking is needed. Only by hearing each other and working together through dialogue can the task be accomplished. When members of a group see that the task cannot be accomplished on their own they are more willing to work together, especially if the task has ramifications in their own lives. Also, the task is often imposed on students by teachers. Freire echoes this problem saying that "many political and educational plans have failed because their authors designed them according to their own personal views of reality, never once taking into account (except as mere objects of their actions) the men-in-a-situation to whom their program was ostensibly directed."(75) When we devise collaborative tasks we must ask ourselves why we want the students to do this and what are they going to gain from it ethically, emotionally and intellectually.

Sizer's use of essential questions is useful in designing collaborative work. By giving collaborative groups large essential questions they must explore each other and cross

the in-between to be successful. Such questions might be: for a literature class - where does evil come from? or for a history class - how is history written? or for a math class - how are numbers manipulated to promote human ideas? and for a biology class - what is the relationship between humans and animals? The goal ultimately is for the students themselves to think of these questions through reflection. Then, the teacher relinquishes the role of facilitator and becomes colleague. "Authentic education," write Freire, "is not carried on by 'A' for 'B' or by 'A' about 'B', but rather by 'A' *with* 'B', mediated by the world which impresses and challenges both parties, giving rise to views or opinions about it."(74) Education becomes a way to mediate the world, to know what our lives are about and we must do this together.

Obstacles to Connected Conversation

Connected conversation and dialogue have many obstacles. Perhaps the two largest obstacles are cultural norms and types of intelligence. In many cultures (especially Asian cultures) it is seen as inappropriate for a student to talk in class. Given the increasing diversity of our classrooms is it reasonable or even possible to expect all students to suspend their cultural norms in order to partake in connected conversation? In many English as a Second Language programs conversation is an integral part of instruction so it seems possible to break down cultural norms for the sake of learning. Furthermore, if conversation is integral to understanding the other and understanding yourself, then dialogue is a legitimate expectation to make of students.

A second obstacle to connected conversation is revealed by Howard Gardner's work on multiple intelligences. Gardner has shown us that there are multiple intelligences at work in our classrooms. Does connected conversation favor those who are linguistically talented? At first it seems to give more voice to those who are skilled at talking. Indeed, Gardner states that "we have put linguistic and logical-mathematical intelligences, figuratively speaking, on a pedastal. Much of our testing is based on this high valuation of

verbal and mathematical skills."(Gardner, 8) By making connected conversation an important part of our class rooms, are we adding to the weighted assessment system based on verbal competence? As educators we need to think of ways to make connected conversation assessible to all our students. An interesting idea would be to construct connected conversation using the other intelligences. Thus, perhaps a group working on an AIDS panel for the quilt would tap the artistic and kinesthetic intelligences as well as the linguistic intellegence of those in the group. There may be ways to integrate intelligences in connected conversation that have not yet been explored.

Class Rooms as Authentic Public Spaces

What we are moving toward is what philosopher Maxine Greene calls "authentic public spaces." Greene writes from an existentialist perspective and as such is concerned with how we choose ourselves over and over again or as Sartre puts it, "I am the Self which I will be, in the mode of not being it."(Sartre 32) Connective conversation enables us to remake ourselves constantly because we are not defined by our singular view nor are we called upon to defend our view as immutable and constant. Emerson wrote that the great man is one who changes his mind. This does not mean we abdicate responsibility for what we say or do, for our commitment to the dialogue of the group speaks of commitment to its outcome. Therefore we are responsible for the decisions the group generates. In a collaborative connected conversation we are able to let other thoughts move our thoughts and thereby we can relinquish our egos but we cannot relinquish our role in the outcome. This dialogue, however, must occur in an authentic public space.

An authentic public space is a place that allows us the freedom to choose ourselves as constantly in the making. In an authentic public space there "are always multiple perspectives and multiple vantage points. There is always more. There is always possibility. And this is where the space opens for the pursuit of freedom."(Greene, 128)

This space should be for adolescents (and all children) primarily the class room. But freedom is a tricky term and it is often misused in our society. Indeed, freedom can be defined in various ways that speak against ethical behavior. For example, "You have the freedom to do anything as long as it isn't against the law." Freedom, Maxine Greene writes, "turns out to mean being left alone by others, not having other people's values, ideas, or styles of life forced upon one, being free of arbitrary authority to work, family and political life."(Greene 19) The problem of such reasoning is easy to expose by posing ethical dilemmas that challenge this notion of freedom. Kohlberg uses such a test in his study of ethical reasoning. He asks students to discuss (note that there is no dialogue asked of here) how they would respond to a man who steals medicine for his sick wife who will die if she does not receive it. The man cannot afford the medicine and the drug owner is very wealthy. Should the man steal the medicine? Certainly stealing is against the law. Is the man free to do what will save his wife? This abstraction is actually quite real, for we know each day millions of people go without medical help because they cannot afford it, yet medical companies in various forms, are making large profits. Freedom is problematic and "misconceptions [of freedom] lead many people to identify personal liberation with an abandonment of social involvement and concern." (Greene 20)

Thus, when I say that an authentic public space allows freedom, I mean that it gives the student a space to "become" through interaction with others via dialogue. Freire writes, "Hope is rooted in men's incompletion, from which they move out in constant search - a search which can be carried out only in communion with others. Hopelessness is a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it."(72) This is markedly different than Kant's practical imperative when he says we must treat others as ends and not as means. Though this is a valuable principle, we must not treat others as finished ends. We must see them as capable of variance. When students become silent it is time to worry. Minority students in particular feel prejudged by the color of their skin and thus may have a more difficult time becoming whoever they wish to be through interaction with the class

room community. To be stuck, to be defined in the eyes of the other, is to be denied the legitimacy or your potential for growth and change. Without this hope that we can evolve, we are more likely to revert to received knowing, we take the information given to us as truth and we never test the waters of our own imaginations. We must challenge ourselves as teachers to determine whether our class rooms are places that allow students to grow or are they places that ask students to conform to one set standard.

The philosopher Simone Weil defines morality "as the silence in which one can hear the unheard voices"(Gilligan, "Exit" 143) This paradoxical and provocative idea is connected to dialogue. There are silences of various kinds in all our classrooms . There is the young gay or lesbian student who is afraid to come out, there is the student who is abused at home or who has an eating disorder. There are students who are so happy about an achievement that they might burst but they do not share the information. Dialogue also listens for those who are not present, the silent voices that need to be brought into the communal language. Though connected conversation is not set up as a therapeutic exchange, by becoming part of the communal language, an individual feels connected and this helps them break their isolation. If dialogue excludes then it is not connected. I have experienced moments of personal sorrow that I could not share and in these times have dreaded faculty meetings or even teaching. What often happens as I am drawn into the conversation is that my sorrow is, at least momentarily, replaced by a feeling of connection and thus my sorrow becomes easier to manage because I do not feel as isolated.

Importantly, authentic public spaces are public. They are not ivory towers nor closeted think tanks. "When the members of a community are forced to attend to public affairs, " writes Alexis de Tocqueville as quoted by Greene, "they are necessarily drawn from the circle of their own interests and snatched at times from self-observation. As soon as a man begins to treat public affairs in public, he begins to perceive that he is not so independent of his fellow men as he had at first imagined, and that in order to obtain their support he must often lend them his cooperation."(Greene 29) Our classrooms have often

become private spaces with out connection to a larger community. Our doors are closed and our students are privately assessed. Is it any wonder that we worry about student behavior when we take them on trips? If the classroom became a place for dialogue about the public domain then the teaching and learning taking place will be enhanced because the connection with others is enhanced. The questions raised by dialoging about the public domain lend themselves to connected conversation. We could ask our students to write a bill of rights for a new society. Any task that promotes dialogue and a reaching outside of content to embrace society is valuable. Cornel West reminds us that "we must focus our attention on the public square-the common good that undergirds our national and global destinies. The vitality of any public square ultimately depends on how much we care about the quality of our lives together."(Association of American Colleges and Universities 9)

Greene writes,

> there may be an integral relationship between reaching out to learn and the 'search' that involves a pursuit of freedom. Without being 'onto something,' young people feel little pressure, little challenge. There are no mountains they particularly want to climb, so there are few obstacles with which they feel the need to engage. They may take no heed of neighborhood shapes and events once they have become used to them- even the figures of homelessness, the wanderers who are mentally ill, the garbage strewn lots, the burned-out buildings. It may be that no one communicates the importance of thinking about them or suggests the need to play with hypothetical alternatives. There may be no sense of identification with people sitting on the benches, with children hanging around the street corners after dark. There may be no ability to take it seriously, to take it personally. Visible or invisible, the world may not be problematized; no one aches to break through a horizon, aches in the presence of the question itself. So there are no tensions, no desire to reach beyond."(124)

These beautiful words remind us that an authentic public space challenges us because of its publicness. It may be easier to teach from the inside of a text book than from the street corner, but the street corner is often where the connected conversations are occurring. Our ability to promote moral growth in our students is directly related to how we "problematize" our classrooms. If we give them tasks that are sterile renderings of memorization then we are asking for passivity and watch as they define themselves according to grades and how a teacher responds to their work. Rather, if we ask them to tackle the world, they must reach out to others for help and together they discover themselves and the other. They are free to invent and to seek meaning.

Part III

Creating Rescuers

"[T]here are pestilences and there are victims; no more than that. . .
I grant we should add a third category; that of the true healers. But it's a fact one doesn't come across many of them, and anyhow it must be a hard vocation. That's why I decided to take in every predicament the victims' side. . . ."
After a short silence the doctor raised himself a little in his chair asked if Tarrou had an idea of the path to follow for attaining peace.
"Yes," he replied. "The path of sympathy." (Camus, *The Plague*)

There is an important element of ethical behavior that connected conversation does not necessarily exercise: imagination. Though I have tried to show that participating in dialogue will translate into creating a more inclusive and caring individual there is, of course, the possibility that there will be no transference between connection and action. One could say that the individual did not actually converse "correctly" if they are then unable to enter the public domain from a procedural knowers perspective. But this expectation is perhaps unrealistic. We know that the complexity of human affairs is such that ethical behavior is extremely difficult to predict. Similarly, we also know that humans are capable of constructing such incredibly oppressive structures that connected dialogue may become extremely difficult and even impossible. Though certainly an extreme example, in the face of such variables, imagination is an additional tool to apply to the promotion of ethical development.

Rules tend to be the way we monitor and try to ensure ethical behavior in our class rooms. As mentioned earlier in Part I, rules are effective for initiating ethical discourse in class rooms (We may want to discuss with our students why we need a particular rule in order to learn?) but by moving the student to a level of moral acquisition that is freely chosen, we would ensure a more consistent transference between ethical behavior in the class room and in our student's greater lives. How often have we observed students we consider exemplary in the class room engage in taunting and perhaps cruel behavior in the lunch room? How do we engage students in the kinds of moral decision making in their own lives that will help build a better society?

The answer again is in connection with the other. I have shown that connected conversation is one way of reaching this understanding of the other as well as a tool for understanding self. But what happens when connected conversation is not possible? When dialogue has been cut for whatever reason, using our social and moral imagination is another alternative that can lead to ethical action. In order to tap our ethical imaginations we must listen for the other in our lives. Since the other is not as physically present because we are unable to converse with them, we must teach our students to see and hear with the mind's eyes and ears. The hope is that by reaching across boundaries with our imaginations, we will care more about the world and its people. When we lock our selves in our own protective reality, especially if that reality is a privileged one, we may revert to moral theorizing but not really change our behavior. Lawrence Thomas writes, "Sometimes the best way to avoid the issue of whether we are making moral progress towards those individuals who have been diminished is to insulate ourselves from them, and simply to do high moral theory which yields the conclusion that all people should be treated equally. To engage in moral deference is very often to ask whether our lives are as good as our theories and rhetoric would incline both ourselves and others to believe. To risk the possibility of a resounding no is courageous, indeed."(Thomas 95) Thus, an initial step to unleashing our moral imaginations is to self assess our current moral selves. If we receive a "resounding

no" in answer to our test, we may then ask, "How do I want my moral self to be?" This question entails the engagement of our imaginations. Importantly, "in our moral reality, only human beings are capable of moral agency: accordingly, it is not principles or theories which are the basic subject of morality; but human beings themselves."(Thomas 84)

Once we have awakened our moral imaginations, how does this translate into action? Certainly we can think differently but we don't necessarily then act differently. By coupling moral imagination with other characteristics we may begin to build a community of committed individuals. Douglas Huneke's work with Christian rescuers of Jews during the Nazi occupation of Europe is especially helpful here. Huneke's work shows us that once the moral imagination has been awakened to our own shortcomings in the face of the suffering of others, then action *may* follow. He outlines the characteristics shared by most rescuers. However, it is very important to keep in mind that rescuers comprised less than .01% of the population in Europe during the war. Obviously, moral action is difficult. I will discuss these characteristics individually but they are:

Characteristics Shared by Rescuers

1. Moral Models
2. Empathetic Imagination
3. Nonconformity and Marginality
4. Adventurousness and Risk Taking
5. Personal Experiences With Suffering and Death
6. Overcoming Prejudice

Moral Models

Huneke notes that all rescuers had one parent who acted as a moral model (few had two parents who filled this role). He notes that "It was essential for parents to establish, articulate, and teach their values and to practice those values with or at least in the presence of the child who would later become a rescuer."(Huneke 104) It is important to note that

only one parent fulfilled this role. In a time when many children are raised in single parent homes, this shows that children are still likely to learn ethical behavior. The conservative view that a two parent heterosexual family is necessary to raise a child with "proper" morals is challenged by Huneke's research. When someone in the neighborhood was hungry, these parents were the ones who would spare some food. Often, these parents would ask their children, "What would you do?" in situations of ethical choice or complex interpersonal relations. This posing of a question was not a game. Often the decision decided on was then acted upon. This form of inquiry also made these rescuers use their imaginations in a socially conscious way from an early age. Thus, their moral imagination was developed over time and with a good deal of guidance and practice.

Certainly, teachers can participate in such moral modeling. If we insist on classrooms of care and justice and if we constantly challenge our students and ourselves to use our moral imagination we may be able to cultivate a habit of moral thinking. Asking students, "What would you do?" when faced with ethical situations in our own class rooms may act as a reinforcing catalyst to ethical development. Not only will such inquiry help develop a moral imagination, but such questioning also helps students recognize their own responsibility for the care of others. When we are told what to do we relinquish our imaginations and assume someone else will have the answers to moral problems. When we are asked "What would you do?" we see that we are also responsible for finding answers to the dilemmas in our world. It is easier to blame an uncaring government than it is to think of our own ways to perform rescue in our world. For example, when the Los Angeles riots rocked the country's consciousness, I spent a number of days discussing what choices students have in their own lives. "Would you have joined the riot?" I asked. "What would you do if you lived in that neighborhood?"

Even the way we conduct our classrooms speak to this question of "What would you do?" One scholar suggests that "students and teachers could negotiate questions such as 'What is the fairest way to help everyone in our class learn?'"(Thorkildsen 372) There

are countless moments in our classrooms when moral modeling can take place. As educators we are constantly faced with prioritizing what it is we want to spend our time on in the class room, but moral modeling can coexists with whatever we decide to do.

Empathetic Imagination

Huneke's second characteristic that he identifies as shared by rescuers is a developed empathetic imagination. This is clearly tied to the questioning discussed above but it is also connected to play acting. Empathetic imagination asks the subject to switch roles or walk in the shoes of someone else. However, the important next step is that you return to your own shoes and know what needs to be done to help that person. Note that you don't assume you have the answers to help someone by merely meeting the person. You must exchange places first. The popular movie *Trading Places* illustrates this theme well. It is only after each character has lived in the other's shoes (literally) that they then know how to help the other.

One way to develop empathetic imagination is through theater. Huneke writes,

> Echanging roles by means of empathic imagining produced a strong commitment to intervene and set their minds to creating alternative means by which they could have a positive effect on the lives of victims. Those with acting skills used these talents to present themselves as the particular scene demanded, in order to take command of a critical encounter or a dangerous situation. They mentally, and whenever possible, physically rehearsed the roles they would play, attending to such details as presentation, posture, breath control, wardrobe, placement, dialogue, and preferred outcome. (111)

Drama has long been a part of Independent school education. Again, however, we may want to prioritize the teaching of drama as a tool for developing empathetic imagination. Do

we require all our students to take drama? Perhaps we should. As mentioned earlier, nothing replaces an actual physical connection with the other, but in place of this possibility a simulated encounter developed through imagination is a good substitute. We may want students to experience the other in an imaginative way and then ask them "Now, what will you do in your life to help this person who you just encountered with your imagination?" This exercise may help spur ethical development.

Nonconformity and Marginality

The third characteristic, nonconformity and marginality, speaks clearly to the adolescent experience. Huneke defines social marginality as "a person's sense that he or she is not part of the mainstream of society or does not accommodate a popular norm or practice. It refers to those who listen to a voice that is different from the dominant voice, follow a conscience that is not informed by the preponderant ethic, or for reasons beyond their immediate control exist outside the majority."(108) Literature is full of such individuals, but more importantly so are our classrooms. How do respond to these students?

Adolescents are trying to break away from their parents and at the same time they are trying to be accepted by peers. Gilligan writes that adolescence is, "the time when thinking becomes self-consciously interpretive, [it] is also the time when the interpretive schemes of the culture, including the system of social norms, values, and roles, impinge more directly on perception and judgment, defining with in the framework of a given society what is the 'right way' to see and to feel and to think the way 'we' think. Thus adolescence is the age when thinking becomes conventional."(Gilligan, "Adolescent" 116) In the face of such pressures, we may want to help our students resist conformity as an important step for ethical development. Most adolescents no matter how much a part of the group, feel marginalized. Indeed, the theater arts are often safe havens for those adolescents who feel and are truly marginalized by their peers and the society. As teachers

we are often worried for these students and we try to respond to parent concerns that their children do not fit in. Instead of viewing them as outcasts and perhaps even perpetuating their state, we may view them as nonconformists with a deeper sense of themselves and a clearer understanding of the society they observe from the sidelines. As Huneke notes, "social marginality serves to help people differentiate themselves, affirms their perspective, empowers them to persevere with their position, and most important, heightens their sensitivity to the plight of others whom they determine to also be socially marginal."(108)

The truth is, however, that these marginalized students often make us feel uncomfortable. How we treat these students in our community can be a moral model for other students. These student's experiences, and the adolescent experience of marginality in general, can be viewed as an important part of ethical development. It is a stage of life when adolescents may be more accessible to identifying with the pain of others because they feel that pain themselves. Also, when faced with an oppressive system (the clique in the lunch room often acts as this system) "social marginality ... has the effect of isolating a person from an objectionable mainstream behavior, and at the same time that it is differentiating a person, it also enables them to exchange roles, which in turn increases the likelihood of an empathic response."(Huneke 108) Thus by being marginalized, a student often is able to resist oppressive behavior because they understand the results of such behavior.

Adventurousness and Risk Taking

As teachers, we often want our students to take intellectual risks. But what we may not realize is that such intellectual risk taking also speaks to ethical development. Gilligan asks, "how [can we] sustain among teenagers an openness to experience and a willingness to risk discovery?"("Adolescent" 123) Risk taking is not reckless and impulsive adventures. "More accurately, ... risk takers carefully calculated dangers in order to mitigate them. They routinely reported that they followed careful, extensive, and elaborate

planning procedures that guaranteed they would experience the challenges and joys of whatever the adventurous activity while minimizing or eliminating injurious threats."(Huneke 106) This practice then transferred into daring behavior during the war. Thus, risk taking became another way to exercise their imagination and critical thinking. "How can I accomplish my goal without getting seriously injured?" is a question that risk takers ask themselves. Risk taking frees the individual from conformist behavior and allows the individual to know themselves and their capabilities. Out door education is an excellent example of how such risk taking can be integrated into the learning environment.

Risk taking in the class room is often assessed by the teacher and takes the form of risking interpretation of subject content. If we push students to also risk the types of relations they forge in the class room then they may not only become better learners but also more ethical people. Asking students to work with someone they have never worked with, for example, may spark their ethical imagination and push them beyond their comfort zones. Furthermore, we might require students to try something new outside the class room. Parents and teachers are charged with protecting students. In doing so, we may be ensuring their conformity and stunt their moral growth. Students who seek alternative educational experiences (such as semesters abroad or Outward Bound experiences) should be encouraged and helped. Their spirit of adventurousness will certainly help them believe that they can act to help others because they will view themselves as more resilient. They will be less dependent on fitting in because they will have experienced being marginalized in a new environment.

Personal Experience with Suffering and Death

The fifth characteristic noted by Huneke is personal experience with suffering and death. Nearly every rescuer had a pre-World War II experience with suffering or death that in some way helped to inform their decision to intervene. As Huneke notes, "These experiences expanded their empathetic imaginations....Familiarity with suffering and death

sensitized these people to the plight of sufferers; and because of parental involvement, it did not cause them to be fearful, repulsed, or morbidly attracted to suffering and death."(118) I am not proposing that each student should have to experience such loss in their teenage years, but when they do experience such traumas, it is important to discuss and build upon the lessons learned. What we may not realize is that most students have experienced a traumatic loss by the time they have reached high school whether it is the death or sickness of a friend, neighbor, parent or grandparent. One year, a junior at our school died unexpectedly. Her death shocked the school and we grappled with how we could help our students "get over" the sudden loss. Instead, we may want to think about how we can help students integrate the loss into their lives in a constructive way. In part the school has done this by asking students to design and then create a stained glass window for the library. The window now speaks to loss but at the same time it literally and figuratively enlightens the student body. When students view the window they do not forget about the young women, they are not "over" her death, instead they remember her and this calling upon memory is another way to use our imagination. The students must call up her image before their eyes and in order to do so they must imagine her; her smiles and comments and play upon the athletic field.

We can also introduce students to concrete examples of suffering and death by sharing our own experiences. When someone in our life is sick or has died we are at times ashamed to share our feelings. Why? We do not wish to burden our students with our problems or simply we do not know how to share such feelings in an open way. However, "the parents of about half the rescuers spoke openly about their feelings and attempted to provide their perspective on the familial experience of death."(Huneke 118). By sharing we are invited our students to practice two ethical tools: connected conversation and empathic imagination. We are also modeling risk taking by sharing difficult feelings in front of the class.

Overcoming Prejudice

The last pertinent characteristic shared by Christian rescuers during the Holocaust is that they were able to overcome their own prejudices. A significant number of rescuers were anti-Semitic, "but they "where people [who] had learned to recognize, confront, and change a bias or prejudice. Rescuers learned to value other human beings and not be afraid of racial and cultural differences or of pluralism generally."(Huneke, 119) Huneke does not elaborate on how these people overcame their bias, but the implications for our class rooms are immense.

We have a tremendous stake in teaching understanding and nurturance of difference of others. The well being of our society depends on our commitment to helping students overcome prejudice. Also, the well being of our students (and ourselves) depends upon our overcoming fears of others who we perceive as different. The parable of the good Samaritan highlights this dilemma. When walking by the poor beggar the good Samaritan asks, "If I do not stop to help this man, what will happen to him?" Of equal importance, however, is the question, "If I do not stop to help this man, what will happen to *me*?" Our moral self is dependent on our performing moral action. Without such action we are left with rhetoric and an empty shell of words that do not translate into our experience. Frederick Douglass, in his autobiography, shows how a lack of moral action transforms his once kindly owner:

> When I went there, she was a pious, warm and tender hearted woman. There was no sorrow or suffering for which she had not a tear. She had bread for the hungry, clothes for the naked, and comfort for every mourner that came within her reach. Slavery soon proved its ability to divest her of these heavenly qualities. Under its influence, the tender heart became stone, and the lamb like disposition gave way to one of tiger-like fierceness.(Douglass, 52-53)

By taking on the oppressive system of slavery, this woman lost her moral self and as a result lost her larger self. Furthermore, she lost her ability to act in the community as a moral agent and model.

Another and more contemporary example is offered to us by Peggy McIntosh in her essay, "White Privilege." McIntosh outlines how having white skin helps her in numerous ways that she is not even aware of. But, more importantly, having this privilege, and being unaware of it, has hurt her development as well. By becoming aware of her privilege she is able to see her unearned accomplishments as at the expense of others. She writes a "list of 46 ordinary and daily ways in which [she] experience[s] white privilege."(McIntosh 2) As a result, she can no longer take for granted her successes, she must see the other and see how her collusion with a system that oppresses hurts others. Once we help students (and ourselves) to recognize their own roles in systems of prejudice they must make a choice to continue participating in that system or change their moral compass to break down their prejudice. Precisely because a student participates in a system of prejudice, it may be hard to understand the other. "Whites are taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, and average, and also ideal, so that when we work to benefit others, this is seen as work which will allow 'them' to be more like 'us'"(McIntosh 5) Imagination asks students to understand what the other's life is like. The purpose is not to make the other like us, but for us to be like the other.

If we allow our students to relinquish a moral self we endanger them and throw them to a life of having to justify unjust and uncaring actions. They must live a lie, or as Sartre would say they, must live in bad faith with themselves. Our responsibility as teachers is to help students see that moral action is not just doing the just and caring thing at that moment, it is also about what happens to us later when we do *not* do the just and caring thing.

Imagination is also useful here to help students see their lives as morally grounded. "What does a moral life look like" is one question to ask. "How does it feel to live a moral

life?" is another. Then, we may want to turn the question to ask, "What does it feel like to *not* act morally?" In both cases we want our students to use their moral imagination to help them act ethically. I have avoided describing specific ways to break down prejudice, for that is an entirely new paper. But, we can certainly use connected conversation and imagination as tools in helping students overcome bias. By connecting the overcoming of prejudice to their own lives and by asking them to think about how it affects them, we may get students to commit to this work.

If we can create a society of rescuers who through using their moral imaginations can tap into an ethic of care and justice, we can create a better world. Importantly, each of these characteristics that Huneke observes in rescuers is teachable. But, each of these characteristics depends upon developing our imaginations so again, as teachers, we need to look at what we teach in order to assess how it helps develop this moral imagination.

Part IV

Conclusion

> Democracy... is a community always in the making. If educators hold this in mind, they will remember that democracy is forever incomplete: it is founded in possibilities. Even in the small, the local places in which teaching is done, educators may begin creating the kinds of situations where, at the very least, students will begin telling the stories of what they are seeking, what they know and might not yet know, exchanging stories with others grounded in other landscapes, at once bringing something into being that is in-between.... It is at moments like these that persons begin to recognize each other and, in the experience of recognition, feel the need to take responsibility for each other. - Maxine Greene (Association of American Colleges and Universities, *Liberal* 27)

By promoting connected conversation and moral imagination in our class rooms we can develop the ethical lives of our students. If we shift our attention to these goals we may begin to build a better society. We do not have to give up the teaching of content, but we can marry content with structural changes in our classes to promote ethical development. The following list of recommendations help clarify how we can achieve this marriage:

- Understand that there are multiple moral orientations at work in our students and in ourselves. We must recognize and encourage the development of an ethic based on principle *and* care.
- Require of our students different ways of knowing. They should practice separate *and* connected knowing. Thus, lesson plans can be devised that ask our students to look at material in both ways.

- Aim for the integration of different ways of knowing to promote procedural knowers in our class rooms.
- Move our focus from content to relationships in the class room.
- Think of our classrooms as authentic public spaces that allow students to grow and redefine themselves continuously.
- Make distinctions between discussion and dialogue and promote dialogue whenever possible as a way to enhance the development of caring relations.
- Ask our students to use their moral imaginations and then seek ways to have them act on their solutions.
- Encourage alternative educational experiences to promote risk taking and empathy.
- Ask students to think about both moral selves and less moral selves and the implications of each on their greater lives.

At the center of moral education there must be a resistance to false dichotomies. Morality is not a subject, nor is it determining what is right and wrong. Instead, moral development is an embracing of complexity and possibility. Maxine Greene reminds us that "freedom is always experienced in relation to others. We are free, not because we are unencumbered, but because of our capacity to envision and to create forms of society that respect one another's integrity and needs, including the needs for recognition, reciprocity, and dignity for each of the particular communities that define Americans' most immediate realities."(Association of American Colleges and Universities, *Drama* 19) Certainly, the class room is a common reality shared by most American children. It is a place that can play a central role in helping students to see complexity and to embrace the others around us. It is also a place where all students can learn about themselves through learning about others.

I have great optimism about the power of teaching and the magic that takes place in a class room. Indeed, I have more belief in the actual experience of coming together to learn than about what book is read or what math problem is solved. Certainly content is

important, but it cannot take precedence over the relationships in the class room. By paying more attention to the structures of these authentic public spaces we can begin to enhance the ethical development of our students.

ANALYSIS OF THE LEARNER CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENTS IMPLIED BY THE PERRY SCHEME**

By Janet L. Cornfeld and L. Lee Knefelkamp
University of Maryland, © 1979

**This material is taken from the authors' article "Combining Student Stage and Style (Perry and Holland) in the Design of Learning Environments"

	DUALISM----POSITION #2	EARLY MULTIPLICITY----#3	LATE MULTIPLICITY----#4	CONTEXTUAL RELATIVISH--#5
VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE	ALL KNOWLEDGE IS KNOWN There is a certainty that RIGHT and WRONG ANSWERS exist for everything. Knowledge is collection of information.	MOST KNOWLEDGE IS KNOWN. ALL IS KNOWABLE (first view of learning as a process that the student can learn). Certainty that there exists a RIGHT WAY to find the Right Answers. Realization that some knowledge domains are "fuzzy."	IN SOME AREAS WE STILL HAVE CERTAINTY ABOUT KNOWLEDGE. IN MOST AREAS WE REALLY DON'T KNOW ANYTHING FOR SURE. Certainty that there is NO CERTAINTY (except in a few specialized areas) Hence--"do your own thing" --all opinions can be just as valid or invalid as all others.	ALL KNOWLEDGE IS CONTEXTUAL All Knowledge is disconnected from any concept of Absolute Truth. However, right & wrong, adequate & inadaquate, appropriate & inappropriate can exist within a specific context and are judged by "rules of adequacy" that are determined by expertise good thought processes.
VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE INSTRUCTOR	Source of Knowledge. Role is to give the knowledge to student. Good Instructor equals Absolute Authority and Knower of Truth.	Source of Right Way to find knowlegde, of how to learn. Role is to model "the way" or process.	Source of the Process of Thinking---modeling the use of supportive evidence ---modeling "the way they want us to think"----- modeling good methods of scholarship. Instructor can also be completely discounted.	Source of expertise. Role of expert/guide/consultant within the framework of "rules of adequacy" and within context. Mutuality of learning is sought. One earns authority through having expertise.
VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE STUDENT	Role is to receive the information or knowledge and to demonstrate having learned the right answers.	Role is to learn how to learn, how to do the processes called for, to apply oneself, and to work hard.	Role is to learn to think for oneself and to learn to use supportive evidence. Independence of thought is valued.	Role is to exercise the use of the intellect, to shift from context to context, and to apply rules of adequacy to information, concepts, perspectives, judgements.

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	DUALISM--POSITION #2	EARLY MULTIPLICITY--#3	LATE MULTIPLICITY--#4	CONTEXTUAL RELATIVISM-#5
VIEW OF PEERS IN THE LEARNING PROCESS	Peers are not a legitimate source of knowledge or learning.	Peers are now more legitimate, often with respect to processes like small group discussions. Interest in variety of perspectives of peers, but still see the instructor as the Final Authority.	Peers are quite legitimate. In a "new dualism", they may replace others. But peers (and others) may not really be listened to, as eneryone's opinion is just as good (or bad) as everyone else's.	Peers are legitimate sources of learning if they use appropriate rules of adequacy and contextual presentation of perspectives. Seek out diversity of opinions and experiences of others. Position alone does not determine legitimacy; process does.
EVALUATION ISSUES	Evaluation directly related to sense of self. Bad/wrong answer = bad/wrong person. Evaluation should be clear-cut, because questions asked & answers should be clear-cut. Is real concern if teacher and content and evaluation format is fuzzy.	Evaluation is THE PRIMARY ISSUE. Often related to amount of time, hard work, "style", and QUANTITY focus. Primary question: HOW ARE MY ANSWERS JUDGED? FAIRNESS is a major issue...fairness in judging, in assignments, in amount of work. A fair evaluation rewards the effort of the student.	"New Truth"--independent thought should get good grades. Can play evaluation game of "give them what they want" no matter what you think. Are learning to accept qualitative criteria as legitimate in evaluation. Value the courage of independence.	Evaluation of work done can be separated from evaluation of the self. Understand that a good critique has positive and negatives. See evaluation as opportunity for feedback, improvement, and new learning. See evaluation as legitimate process/part of learning.
PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL TASKS	Learning basic information and definitions of words and concepts. Learning to identify parts of the whole. Beginning to be able to compare & contrast things. Learning to provide explanation of why they answered as they did.	Can do compare & contrast tasks. Can see multiples----perspectives, parts, opinions, evaluations. Do basic analytic tasks. Use supportive evidence. First understanding of PROCESS as concept. See difference between process & content for first time.	Good at analysis. Can do some synthesis. Can do critique with positives & negatives. Use supportive evidence well. Can relate learning to other issues in other classes or to issues in "real life"--if they will apply themselves to that task. Learning to think in abstractions.	Relate learning in one context to learning in another with some ease. Look for relationships in the learning. See complexity. Can evaluate, conclude, support own analysis. Can synthesize Can adapt, modify, and expand concepts because they understand the concepts. Fluidity of thought and analysis. Good with abstraction.

ANALYSIS OF THE LEARNER CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENTS IMPLIED BY THE PERRY SCHEME**

By Janet L. Cornfeld and L. Lee Knefelkamp
University of Maryland, © 1979

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	DUALISM--POSITION #2	EARLY MULTIPLICITY--#3	LATE MULTIPLICITY--#4	CONTEXTUAL RELATIVISM--#5
SOURCES OF CHALLENGE	Ambiguity; diffuseness or its appearance; multiple perspectives on something; uncertainty---especially by an Authority; any disagreement between two respected Authorities; concept of independent thought; request for the interpretation of the student.	View that uncertainty isn't just temporary. Complexity ---initially seen as quantity, not quality. Evaluation causes great concern. Learning processes as opposed to facts. Trying to determine "which of the multiples is <u>really</u> right." Quantity is challenge---amount of work and effort required.	Demand to use evidence to support opinion. Learning to sort out which are good sources and which are not. Learning to accept responsibility in the learning process. For some--learning to listen to authority again. For others--learning to think independently.	Requirement of choice or commitment. How to choose between equally good alternatives? Highly challenged to intellectual excellence. Good role modeling of scholarship that is still beyond their capabilities. New context.
SOURCES OF SUPPORT	High degree of structure. Concrete examples and experiential learning. Joy in the opening of the world of knowledge. Careful sequencing and timing of presentation of diversity. Safe learning environment where people are respected and treated kindly. Modeling on part of instructor. Chance to practice skills and evaluation tasks.	Still need structure to help as they move into more and more diversity and ambiguity. Clarity of evaluation procedures and assignment instructions. Enjoy new freedom in the learning. Peers are big source of support. Comfort still in the thought that someday we will know all. Comfort that we know the right process and that the right answer is out there waiting to be found.	Enjoy diversity. Tend to balk at structure...seek independence. Seek class atmosphere that is free and independent. Comfort with different formats, although may clearly prefer one. Can play the intellectual "game" fairly well. Enjoy some of the thinking tasks.	Truly enjoy all the diversity and options until they become a new form of the old position 3 confusion Feel comfortable moving across contexts--have the intellectual tools to do so. Feeling of intellectual mastery. Comfortable seeking aid of appropriate authority/expert.

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